Resistance to McCarthyism at the University of Illinois by Lenski, Cristy L.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
...............19.13.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY
......................... CRISTY L. LENSKI......................
entitled....B#.sl«.);«ns.9...£.9...j^ &«c£.hxlRm.M..LhR...Unly«i;fi^ t;y...e.f...UUn»iiL.
IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
DEGREE OF.....Mfi.hfi^9.L..ftf...ALRA..iR..UbAr.»l..^l;j»...fln,4...5.fiilSBftRA___________________„
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF. ..HISTORY m — h »
RESISTANCE TO McCARTHYISM
AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
BY
C R IS T Y  L. LEN SK I
T H E S IS
for the
D E G R E E  O F BACHELO R O F A R TS
IN
H ISTO RY
College of Liberal Arts and Scien ces  
University of Illinois 
Urbana, Illinois
1989
Contents
Introduction.................................................................................................................................... .
I. Issu e s and Answ ers: T h e Academ y and
McCarthyism..................................................................................................................................5
II. Public Pressures and Strategic
Resistance.....................................................................................................................................
III. M cCarthyism  and the "Labor
College”........................................................................................................................................ ..
IV. Conclusion............................................................................................................................ ..
71Bibliography,
Introduction
in May of 1953, University of Illinois President George D. Stoddard 
received a curious letter. As an educator, he was asked to explain, "Why is 
the United States so hysterically afraid of Communism and 
Communists?"’ To this, there was no simple answer. The anti-communist 
hysteria In America was already well advanced by the late I940's. A little 
known Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph R. McCarthy, used this 
hysteria to raise himself to national prominence. Joe McCarthy did not 
create "McCarthylsm" but manipulated the popular mood to his political 
advantage. The antl-communlst sentiment was already in place. In the 
early 1940’s, California’s Committee on Un-American Activities led the 
way In attacking the Communist influence In public schools. The Dies 
Committee, which eventually became known as the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC), began Its Investigations of subversive 
persons and organizations early in this decade. Under the Truman 
administration, the Attorney General's list was the first official blacklist 
of radical groups. The President's Executive Order Initiated a loyalty 
program for federal employees. A series of International events In the late 
1940’s also helped to Ignite American's obsession with domestic security. 
All in the same general time frame, relations with the Soviets 
deteriorated, China "fell" to the Communists, and Communist forces 
invaded South Korea. Worse yet, actual cases of espionage were 
discovered, including the Rosenberg spy ring, the Amerasla affair, and the 
case of Alger Hiss. The spirit of McCarthylsm was alive and well. Only a
2few would challenge this hysteria, and fewer yet successfully resisted.
The states conducted their own anti-communist movement 
separately from the national scene. James Selcralg’s recent study, The Red 
Scare in the tlidwest, 1945-1955: A State and Local Study, thoroughly 
addressed this issue. He concluded that “the conservative effort, which 
simultaneously occurred on national, state, and local levels, set the 
dominant mood for the era."2 This study will examine the degree to which 
McCarthyism penetrated to state politics in lllnols. The chapters that 
follow will show how state legislators adopted the anti-communist Issue 
to suit their political purposes. The impact of McCarthyism can be 
measured by taking a closer look at Its relationship to the academy 
through the University 01 Illinois.
As recent studies have shown, the universities could not escape the 
hysteria of anti-communism. Nationwide, intellectuals debated the 
interpretation of academic freedom. Individuals divided over what criteria 
should determine the fitness of the Communist teacher. Lines were drawn 
and categories were set. One group, which may be labeled the Civil 
Libertarians, vowed to protect academic freedom at all costs and 
criticized those who cooperated with McCarthyltes. Recent studies 
frequently embrace this absolutist Civil Libertarian assumption.3 Another 
group, the liberal anti-communists, took a middle position and denied the 
legitimacy of the absolutist version of academic freedom. This was the 
stand that the President of the University of Illinois, George Stoddard, 
assumed. A study of his administration will show how these categories 
hold up In the reality of public pressures on the university.
As a state-supported Institution, the University of Illinois was 
subject to outside pressures from the McCarthyltes. The observations of 
Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thellens, Jr. that a public university was 
vulnerable to pressures from state politicians, trustees, and interest 
groups will be examined.4 McCarthyltes found ways to use the 
anti-communist issue to influence the affairs of the University of Illinois. 
The chapters that follow will show how successful they were.
Two recent studies of McCarthylsm and the universities have 
criticized the academy for cooperating with the Cold War anti-communist. 
In her study No Ivory Tower, Ellen Schrecker concluded, "The academy did 
not fight McCarthylsm. It contributed to It." This behavior, she asserted, 
was "demoralizing" as one would expect Intellectual freedom to flourish 
in the universities. Lionel Lewis took this criticism even further, 
declaring, "Academic authorities, particularly campus presidents, were 
responsible for the Cold War on campus; they brought the Cold War to 
campus." This study will call into question the Schrecker-Lewls 
Indictment of academic cowardice considering the degree of McCarthyite 
public pressures upon the University of Illinois. In the two cases that 
follow, the presidency of George Stoddard and the Institute of Labor and 
Industrial Relations crisis, clear resistance to the movement was strong. 
How effective were outspoken university officials in fighting the 
hysteria? The Impact of the University's response to McCarthylsm will 
help to determine whether or not combating the movement really did any 
good.5
4Notes
1. Richard Gray to George Stoddard, 3 1 May 1953, papers of George 
Stoddard 1946-1953, Manuscripts of Addresses, Box 2, University of 
Illinois Archives.
2. James T. Selcralg, The Red Scare In the Midwest, 1945-1955: A 
State and Local Study (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1982), 149.
3. Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986; Lionel Lewis, Cold War on Campus (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1988).
4. Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thellens, Jr., The Academic Mind 
(Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958), 180-81. 5
5. Schrecker, 340; Lewis, 5.
Chapter I
Issues and Answers: The Academy and McCarthylsm
By the I930's, organized left-wing political activity had developed 
on America's campuses. The universities formulated methods and policies 
to deal with radicals, partlcally targeting the Communist teacner. Faculty 
dismissals and expulsions occurred, but usually only as a response to an 
Individual's political activities. However, as the fears of Cold War 
mounted, this began to change. Intellectuals, conservative and liberal 
alike, began to question and debate whether a Communist Party member 
should rightfully be excluded from areas such as teaching, not because of 
their specific activities but on the basis of their political beliefs. The 
University of Washington was the first academic body t.o face this issue 
head on. McCarthyites In many states sought to trap the radical by 
requiring teacher loyalty oaths. Scholars, particularly In California, 
protested the atmosphere of suspicion that surrounded their profession. 
Some states were quite successful In providing the legal authorization to 
dismiss a Communist teacher. As a moral Issue, this legislation was 
hotly debated.
Colleges and universities were regularly pressured by McCarthyites 
to purge their faculties of radicals. Administrators often responded fcy 
cooperating with the antl-communlst forces, and as a result, many 
Innocent victims paid the price. An extraordinary number of scholars were 
not only dismissed from their teaching positions but also from the 
academic community for many years afterward because their names 
appeared on a blacklist. However, before we Indict the academy as a whole
6for Its cowardice, one must consider the administrators who did resist 
the McCarthyite pressures and what Impact they actually had. At the 
University of Illinois, President George Stoddard was one such 
administrator who responded tn this way. Before examining this 
University Itself, one needs a broader understanding of the Issues that 
emerged within the academy. Finally, this chapter takes a closer look at 
the political situation in the state of Illinois with respect to the 
anti-communist issue.
Intellectuals, particularly those In the liberal camp, had argued 
over emerging McCarthyite Issues, especially over the status of the 
Communist teacher. However, no specific case had yet received national 
attention that would offer Intellectuals a chance to interpret academic 
freedom. The University of Washington dismissals provided such an 
opportunity. Prompted by the investigative pressure of the legislative 
Canwell Committee, the University filed charges against three professors 
who had refused to testify. While two of the three admitted their radical 
affiliations to the Faculty Tenure Committee, neither appeared to be a 
dangerous Indoctrlnator. The third professor still refused to testify. Even 
though the Faculty Tenure Committee recommended the retention of all 
three, the Board of Regents fired them, and placed three other scholars 
who also were investigated on probation. Throughout the probe, President 
Raymond Allen was cooperative and concurred with the decision of the 
Regents. The President of the Board of Regents Informed one newspaper 
that the firings served "notice everywhere throughout the country that the 
University of Washington Is notifying Communists to stay away from the 
University campus."1
7Nationwide, all Interested eyes focused on the events at the 
University of Washington to examine the first case study on the treatment 
of the Communist teacher. A formal split emerged among liberals as they 
took isssue with the criteria for determining the fitness of the 
Communist teacher.
One group, termed the Civil Libertarians, was led by Alan Barth, 
Alexander Meiklejohn, and Henry Steele Commager. These intellectuals 
united in their argument that the preservation of civil liberties was the 
most Important consideration in determining the status of the Communist 
teacher. For these individuals, scholars' political beliefs alone were not 
reason enough to exclude them from the academic community. The Civil 
Libertarians concluded that restraining or limiting the scope of academic 
freedom was a greater danger to American democracy than allowing a few 
traitors and saboteurs to escape.
Other intellectuals, such as Sidney Hook, Norman Thomas, and 
Arthur 0. Lovejoy, strongly believed that a university was justified in 
dismissing a scholar for their general beliefs in the absence of action, 
Citing the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party, these 
Intellectuals asserted that the exclusion of radicals was essential to the 
preservation of academic freedom. The Civil Libertarian absolutists 
denounced this viewpoint as an "updated version of academic freedom" and 
another example of how well the academy cooperated with the 
McCarthyites.2 A good number of university administrators, including 
President George Stoddard at the University of Illinois, followed this 
school of thought, emphasizing the Importance of academic freedom while 
doubting the fitness of the Communist teacher. By examining the
8adminstratlon of Dr. Stoddard, one can better assess the Impact of a 
liberal antl-communlst's resistance to McCarthylsm.
As debates over the morality of excluding the Communist teacher 
continued, state governments attempted to provide legal justification for 
dismissals. People also argued over the constitutionality of the 
restrictive legislation. In New York, the Felnberg Act, to the dismay of 
educators, was made into law in less than a month. This law provided a 
special official In each school district with the power to investigate 
teachers’ political affiliations. Membership in the Communist Party 
brought automatic dismissal. In 1952, the constitutionality of the 
Felnberg law was officially challenged, but the Supreme Court upheld It. 
Illinois legislators made several attempts to pass restrictive 
anti-communist legislation but failed, largely because of an Intense 
partisan struggle on the political scene. This is. ' is examined later In 
this chapter.
In the late 1940's and early 1950‘s, the loyalty oath requirement 
was another hotly-debated issue. Teacher loyalty oaths had been 
Instituted after World War I, but, in time, had faded away. With the 
resurgence In Amertcan conservatism after World War II, the educator was 
once again singled out. Scholars protested the atmosphere of suspicion 
that the oath requirement brought to their profession. Usually, the 
language of loyalty oaths Itself was threateningly vague. By and large, 
university administrators and faculty members did not believe that an 
oath was an effective way to catch the really dangerous subversives and 
saboteurs, in 1950 through 1951, the most vigorous protest of the loyalty 
oath was heard from the University of California. Faculty members
9objected to the Board of Regents decision to Include the oath requirement 
within contracts. The scholars particularly disliked the way the the oath 
targeted the- teaching profession. By March 1951, as a result, the 
University had lost approximately 110 scholars due to dismissals, 
resignations, and refused offers of appointment.3 In 1952, the 
constitutionality of the oaths was challenged and defeated In the 
California Supreme Court. The University of California was ordered to 
reinstate the non-signers. Professors were allowed to claim their back 
pay after a March 1956 ruling. Shortly after the 1952 decision, the Board 
of Regents substituted yet another loyalty oath for the faculty. This time, 
professors did not object because the language had not singled out the 
academic community.
Pressured by McCarthyite forces, administrators and faculty 
responded with strategies that often reflected their view of academic 
freedom. A case study of the Stoddard administration at the University of 
Illinois will show what some of these methods were. Their effectlvenes In 
combating the forces of McCarthylsm will be examined. First, It Is 
necessary to take a closer look at the setting In Illinois and the 
atmosphere that President Stoddard had to face.
The Middle Way of Illinois
Each state had their own way of meeting the anti-communist 
hysteria. Illinois fell between the two extremes of the states that had the 
most severe restrictions and those that had none at all.^ The 
anti-communist issue appeared often on the political scene, but did not 
always figure largely In the election results. Colleges and universities
10
tried to establish their own strategies and ground rules, often by quietly 
acting against left-wing organizations on campus, Both private and public 
institutions faced a good deal of pressure from McCarthyItes to purge the 
radicals from the universities. The magnitude of these pressures, 
particularly in the case at the University of Illinois, often affected the 
Impact of the administration's response. Illinois McCarthyltes were 
Initially successful In their advancement of anti-communist legislation. 
By 1949, this changed as tension between the Democratic Governor Adlal 
Stevenson and the Republican dominated legislature resulted in a 
stalemate. The Seditious Activities investigating Commission, also known 
as the Broyles Commission, expired only after a short two year existence, 
In spite of vigorous efforts to resurrect an investigating unit and to push 
through restrictive legislation, no significant gains were made until 1955. 
By then, the McCarthyite movement had lost some of Its fire.
Throughout the Cold War era, the anti-communist Issue was used to 
exploit an enemy's weaknesses. By the late I940's, the Republican Party 
had not been in the White House In the for well over a decade. Almost to 
the point of desperation, the Republicans sought an Issue that they could 
use to regain thetr political base, The Party took advantage of the fears of 
Cold War and the emerging wave of conservatism In America to manipulate 
the anti-communist issue to their political advantage. The opponent, the 
Democratic Party, could easily be discredited for being "soft" on 
communism. Republicans criticized many of the liberal programs, such as 
the New Deal, as radical. Broader Issues of liberal Ideology were termed 
as "radical." Soon, many Democrats discovered that the best defense 
against McCarthylsm was to take a tough stand on communism themselves.
In Illinois, most attacks upon the University of Illinois came from the 
Republicans. In this study, the term "conservative" will refer to the GOP 
anti-communist activists on the Illinois political scene.
Typically In Cold War era campaigns, one Individual accused his 
opponent of being "soft" on communism or of having radical connections. 
Candidates often argued over the best methods to fight Communists, whll 
each claimed to be the better defender of traditional American freedoms. 
Although most visible In the national and larger state elections, the 
anti-communist Issue penetrated to local politics, especially In bigger 
cities. However, a candidate's strong McCarthyite rhetoric was often not 
enough to win the election, In the 1947 Chicago mayoral race, GOP 
candidate Russell W. Root charged that his opponent, Democrat Martin 
Kennelly, was supported by the Communist Party. Due to the strong 
organization of the Democratic Party In Chicago, the radical charges did 
not figure largely In the results as Kennelly captured 598 of the vote.^
In the 1948 Illinois race for U.S. Senate, Democratic candidate Paul 
H. Douglas successfully dodged charges of radicalism by emphasizing his 
anti-communist beliefs. His straightforward, effective speaking ability 
allowed him to best Implement his strategies. Only a few months prior to 
the election, GOP Congressman and former House Un-American Activities 
Committee member Fred E. Busby publicly described Douglas as a "friend 
of Communism" whose "record brands him with red paint." Busby named 
twenty-three radical organizations that Douglas allegedly had been 
associated with. Douglas responded In a speech given at Urbana, Illinois. 
Successfully presenting himself as a liberal anti-communist, Douglas 
pointed out that the "Russian concept of Justice" violated his Quaker
12
beliefs. In November 1948, Douglas was elected by over a quarter of a 
million votes. 6
In the 1950 Illinois race for U.S. Senate, GOP Congressman Everett 
M. Dlrksen capitalized on the McCarthyite Issue. In his campaign, Dlrksen 
promised a "house cleaning...of sympathizers and party-liners such as this 
country has never seen before."7 Aided by this type of rhetoric, Dlrksen 
triumphed over the incumbent, Democrat Scott W. Lucas, This same 
strategy was used successfully in the University of Illinois Board of 
Trustees race as GOP candidate Harold "Red" Grange promised a purge of 
campus radicals.
Some colleges and universities established ground rules against 
left-wing organizations by quietly dismissing professors who 
participated In such political activity. At Bradley University In Peoria, the 
President discouraged his faculty from becoming too involved with the 
Progressive Party. When some faculty members met with Illinois 
Progressive leaders outside city limits, one professor was not given a 
contract renewal for the following year. At Eastern Illinois State 
Teachers College, a faculty member who chaired the local Progressive 
group was ordered to resign from his chairmanship and to cease his 
political activities. Even though the professor acquiesced, his contract 
was not renewed for the following year. Both of these cases show how far 
academic Institutions were willing to go to avoid even a remote 
connection to radicalism.
At the University of Illinois, ground rules for the exclusion of 
radical organizations from campus were established by a legislative act. 
Original opposition, however, came from students themselves. In 1947,
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the campus chapter of American Youth for Democracy (AYD) was 
identified by the student newspaper as a Communist front. The Daily m ini 
printed numerous letters and editorials that opposed the AYD’s presence 
on the campus. Protest mounted In May 1947 when the AYD scheduled 
Communist Party member Molly Lleber to speak at a closed meeting. Dean 
of Students Fred H. Turner permitted this because of the AYD's "members 
only" promise. State legislators were outraged when a number of 
non-members were admitted to the meeting. Rep. Charles Clabaugh 
(R.-Champalgn) reacted immediately by sponsoring what became known as 
the Clabaugh Act. Successfully banning the AYD chapter at the University 
of Illinois, the Act read, “ No trustee, official Instructor, or other 
employee of the University of Illinois shall extend to any subversive, 
seditious, and un-American organization, or Its representatives, the use 
of any facilities of the University for the purpose of carrying on, 
advertising or publicizing the activities of such an organization."8
In 1948, the Young Progressives of America (YPA), a left-wing 
group associated with the campaign of Henry Wallace, was organized on 
campus. In January 1949, after leaders signed an oath that the group was 
not a Communist front, President Stoddard supported and encouraged the 
Committee on Student Affairs to recognize the YPA. Harrassed by students 
on campus and by policemen in Matoon, IL while attempting to obtain 
signatures to place party candidates on the ballot, YPA participation 
waned. By August 1950, the administration withdrew Its recognition 
policy, stating that the YPA lacked an open membership list and a 
sufficient number of undergraduate members. In the fall of 1950, the YPA 
attempted to reorganize but failed, largely because of the University's
Insistence on an open membership list. Students feared that left-wing 
connections would hinder future employment opportunities. Likewise, 
faculty members were reluctant to sponsor such an organization that 
could be misconstrued as communistic by the McCarthyltes.^
Other schools went even a step further to avoid the 
antl-communtst attacks. Southern Illinois University President President 
Chester F. Lay readily cooperated with the McCarthyite movement. Lay 
told the Broyles Commission In 1949 that "some of us professors and 
administrators may have to admit that now Is the time for Indoctrination 
in the American way of life.”' 0 Because of Lay's restrictive view of 
academic freedom, he was not immediately suspect like President 
Stoddard was to McCarthyltes.
McCarthyite pressures on academic Institutions came from a 
number of different sources depending upon whether the school was 
private or public. The magnitude of these pressures affected the 
administrator's strategies of responses to the movement. Public 
universities like Southern lll-.nols University and the University of llllnol 
were vulnerable to members of General Assembly, who appropriated their 
budget. When legislators disliked some campus activity or administrative 
action, they often threatened to reduce or eliminate the institution's 
funding. One SlU professor noted, "It is quite true that the Administration 
is forced to walk cautiously because legislators disturbed about opinions 
and activities at Southern could cut the University off with 
embarrassingly few pennies."’ ’ However, private Institutions were not 
immune to attacks. Administrators at Northwestern University and the 
University of Chicago, for example, were vulnerable to their McCarthyite
15
trustees and donors. This study does not cover private colleges 
specifically. The chapters that follow examine the Impact that public 
pressures had upon the state-supported Institution, the University of 
Illinois.
In August 1947, McCarthyite legislators In Illinois Initiated a 
seemingly large step tn the antl-communlst movement. The Broyles 
Commission, chaired by Republican Senator Paul Broyles of Mount Vernon, 
was created to Investigate persons or organizations "suspected of being 
directed toward the overthrow of the Government of the United States or 
the State of Illinois." A subcommittee to examine textbooks was later 
organized, but there Is no record as to whether this body actually 
functioned. The Broyles Commission announced Its Intention to target the 
educator who tended to "glamorize the various -Isms, especially 
communism." The Commission operated with the political purpose of 
suppressing reformism, viewing the liberal as " a political thinker or 
actor whose feelings, thought, and actions are In favor of the Kremlin."
The Broyles Commission Initially operated behind closed doors. After the 
reports from their investigations and proceedings were released, the 
Commission became known for Its frequent spelling errors and Improper 
grammar usage.’2
By 1949, the Broyles Commission was ready to introduce Its 
anti-communist legislation in the General Assembly. If approved, the 
measures would require the dismissal of subversive public school 
teachers, outlaw communism, and mandate the signing of loyalty oaths for 
all public officials, Including educators. Protest mounted throughout the 
state. Opponents argued that Illinois' existing laws were sufficient to
16
combat radicalism. At the University of Illinois, fifty faculty members 
signed a petition of protest against the Broyles bills. Professors found the 
wording "to be so vague as to do damage to the very freedoms we hold 
dear."13 Criticism from the University certainly did not sit well with the 
McCarthyite legislators.
Opposition to the Broyles bills reached Its height when 
approximately 500 unruly protestors marched to the state capital In 
Springfield. Legislators noted that a number of them were students from 
the University of Chicago and Roosevelt College. Angered by a disruptive 
Impromptu student sit-in at the Abraham Lincoln Hotel, Rep. G. William 
Horsley (R.-Sprlngfield) Introduced a bill to Investigate the two 
institutions and pushed it through the General Assembly. Legislators 
suspected that the student protestors were "being Indoctrinated with 
Communistic and other subversive theories." University of Chicago 
Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins doubted the charge, pointing out, "Rudeness 
and redness are not the same thing."14
McCarthyite legislators watched and waited for Democratic 
Governor Adlal Stevenson's action on the bill. Stevenson knew that If he 
vetoed the proposal, Republican legislators would attack him for taking a 
"soft" stand against communism. Although he doubted the legality of the 
investigation, Stevenson allowed the bill to become law without his 
signature. The roots of a partisan struggle between the Republican 
McCarthy 1 tes and the Democratic governor were evident. To each side, the 
other was suspect. Each sought to expose the other's vulnerabilities to 
their political advantage.
The Broyles Commission's investigation did not find any evidence
17
of subversion In the two colleges. The highlight of the proceedings was 
the testimony of Chancellor Hutchins. Hts direct, witty responses 
encouraged others to defy the Commission. He Insisted, "I cannot testify 
concerning subversive activities at the University of Chicago, because 
there are none." Hutchins made the Broyles Commission's investigation 
appear unnecessary and ridiculous, which, to a large extent, it was. In one 
Chicago newspaper editorial, one Individual commented that Hutchins had 
"made a monkey of the cross-examiner" Mockery c-f this type helped to 
shorten the life of the Commission. In an attempt to save face, chief 
investigator J.B. Matthews insisted, "When It comes to distortion of tne 
truth, Hutchins is a perfectionist."15
The majority report of the Broyles Commission revealed the 
McCarthyite viewpoint of the Investigation. The legislators strongly 
recommended that schools expel Communist professors and students, as 
well as those who refused to answer charges or to name names. The 
McCarthyltes warned that refusal to do this would mean the end of that 
Institution's tax exempt status, or In the case of a public university, 
would mea.' the dismissal of the Board of Trustees. The University of 
Illinois Board was not threatened by this because the trustees were 
elected, not appointed. Two active members of the Commission, one 
Democrat and one Republican, refused to sign the majority report and 
wrote their own dissents. Both legislators found no evidence of subversion 
In either of the colleges Investigated.
In the 1949 legislative session, the Senate passed three of the five 
Broyles bills, but none made It through the House. In that same year, the 
Broyles Commission was allowed to expire. The Commission made no
18
recorded effort to verify data that they had obtained from witnesses. They 
never even attempted to Investigate the Illinois Communist Party Itself, 
focusing Instead on education and liberalism per se. In Its short two year 
life, the Broyles Commission failed to find any real evidence of subversion 
or any specific instances of Indoctrination.16
Despite the clear absence of subversion, the McCarthyites pushed on 
by attempting to pass restrictive legislation. They did not need 
substantial evidence to make someone the subject of attack. A second set 
of Broyles bills was Introduced In the 1951 legislative session. The bills 
would outlaw subversion, require a loyalty oath for public employees, and 
give an Assistant Attorney General the power to Investigate the state's 
radical factor. Throughout the state, groups rallied against the legislation. 
The Chicago League of Women Voters published a pamphlet entitled, "We 
Think They Are Mistaken" to help sway public opinion. Newspapers such as 
the Chicago Sun-Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch also helped stir 
up oppostion. The bills struggled In both the House and the Senate. Senator 
Broyles became emotional, declaring, "There are Communists everywhere, 
even in the Statehouse."17 Largely because legislators wanted to avoid the 
taint of assuming a pro-ccmmuntst position, the bills passed both houses. 
A few weeks later, Governor Stevenson killed the Broyles bills with his 
veto. This power of the Governor played a significant role In the partisan 
struggle because up until the late 1960's, It was virtually unheard of for 
the legislature to override an executive's veto.
Again In 1953, Senator Broyles Introduced the same bills, but added 
a proposal to resurrect the Broyles Commission. This time, opposition to 
the legislation was even more Intense, The Chicago League of Women
19
Voters once again published a pamphlet of protest entitled, “We Still 
Think They Are Mistaken." Groups, especially around the Chicago area, 
organized to protest the legislation, urging citizens to express their 
opposition In letters to their legislators. The Chicago Dally News 
reported that Republican Governor William Stratton's mall was running ten 
to one against the Broyles bills.18
At the University of Illinois, vocal opposition to the bills certainly 
did not endear the faculty and administration to the McCarthyite 
legislators. The University Senate sent a resolution to the Lieutenant 
Governor, criticizing the Broyles bills as a “threat to the honored tradition 
of academic freedom" and an example of "modern totalitarianism." 
President Stoddard approved of the resolution and referred to it as a 
"well-thought-out document." A group of forty-six faculty members 
circulated a petition that criticized the Broyles bills as unnecessary and 
dangerously threatening. One professor asserted, "A vote for the Broyles 
bills Is not a vote against communism, but a vote for conformity and 
against academic freedom." Senator Everett Peters (R - St. Joseph) reacted 
to the University's opposition, calling protestors "refugees from 
Washington" who had been "promoted unfairly over able men already 
there."19
The legislation passed the Senate but stumbled In the House. 
Defeating the bill for the revival of the Broyles Commission, the House 
approved of the remaining legislation, the same package that Broyles had 
proposed in 1951. The 1953 bills were vetoed by Governor Stratton "with 
regret,"20 As a Republican, Stratton, who was elected In 1953, was less 
suspect than the Democrat Stevenson was and received less criticism for
20
the veto. Stratton was not a political opponent of the McCarthyite 
legislators.
Senator Broyles earned a victory at last in 1955, although a minor 
one. Once again he Introduced legislation to outlaw the Communist Party 
and to require loyalty oaths. The CP outlawry proposal was defeated, but 
the oath requirement passed both houses. Governor Stratton found the act 
acceptable, and Senate Btll 58 became law In July 1955. By this time, the 
McCarthyite movement had begun to lose Its fire.
The anti-communist Issue In Illinois was manipulated by the 
Republicans to exploit their enemies' weaknesses. Colleges and 
universities established ground rules that tried to meet the radicalism 
Issue before the McCarthyttes attacked. A hostile partisan struggle 
characterized the Illinois political scene. As a result, McCarthyltes made 
no significant gains to advance their fight against communism or against 
their political enemies. A tense political atmosphere prevailed In Illinois 
and set the stage for the administration of President George Stoddard at 
the University of llllnots.
Internal Conflict In the Stoddard Reign
The administration of President George Stoddard (1946 -1953) was 
marked by a number of controversies, many of which were linked to the 
radicalism Issue. It Is necessary to more closely examine these Issues to 
get a sense of the Internal atmosphere on campus. The well-publicized 
troubles in the Department of Economics In the College of Commerce and 
Business Administration Involved administrative problems and personality 
conflicts, but developed into something more. Republican backlash against
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broader liberal Ideology provoked criticism of such things as the New Deal 
and Keynesian economics. An educator’s connection to these Items often 
made him suspicious to the McCarthyttes. Because many of the newer 
faculty members In the College of Commerce had worked in Washington, 
D.C. In liberal administrations, they were Identified as "New Dealers" and 
"pinks."21 The conflict emerged as political when newpapers stressed the 
differences between the "old guard" and the "new guard."
By 1960, when McCarthylsm was no longer a central Issue, the 
University behaved differently with regard to the controversial radical 
factor. When charges were filed against Edward Yellln, an engineering 
graduate student, for his refusal to testify In HUAC Investigations, the 
McCarthyite pressure was not as fierce as It had been under the Stoddard 
administration. This pressure can be seen clearly by examining the College 
of Commece controversy.
When the Intense, long conflict In the Economics Department 
surfaced In the Spring of 1950, the radical factor was nowhere In the 
picture. Economics Professor Ralph Blodgett announced his decision to 
leave Illinois for a position at the University of Florida because of 
"unfavorable conditions" within the College of Commerce. A month later, 
the Champaign-Urbana News-Gazette reported that Blodgett's true 
reasons for leaving the University were because of Dean Howard R.
Bowen’s "gross maladministration" and the Economics Department's shift 
from "free enterprise" to "government controls and deficit spending" 
ideology.22
From this point on, the University was strongly criticized for 
Importing "flashy brains," "New Dealers," and "pinkish Intellectuals."
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President Stoddard came under fire for hiring new faculty, such as Howard 
Bowen, rather than promoting the people who were already on staff. Some 
faculty members, particularly Economics Professor Don L. Kemmerer, 
charged that Blodgett's academic freedom had been violated because of the 
liberal "new guard" within the department. Ironically, a few years earlier, 
Blodgett himself had been attacked by the Chicago Tribune and a GOP 
legislator for his Joint authorship of a "communist" t e x t . 2 ^
Provost Coleman Griffith, acting for President Stoddard who was 
away In Europe, appointed the Harno Committee to investigate the 
Blodgett affair. The Committee concluded that the professor had not been 
"forced out" and the conflict tn the Economics Department was the result 
of a failure In human relations rather than any violation of academic 
freedom.24 Provost Griffith considered the case officially closed.
However, by this time, a sharp decisive split within the College of 
Commerce had developed between the "old guard" and the "new guard." In 
the fall of 1950, the old guard organized a “confidence" poll of the 
administration of Dean Howard Bowen through the College's Executive 
Committee. Results seeemed to show that the majority of the faculty had 
"no confidence" In Bowen's administration. However, many ballots had been 
mailed directly to Stoddard in protest, and a number of faculty members 
who were qualified to vote never received ballots at all. The stalemate 
within the Economics Department continued.
Within the camp of the new guard or the pro-Bowen forces, 
newspapers noted that many faculty members had worked In New Deal 
administrations. Some of these newer professors were Identified as 
liberal Keynesian economists even If their beliefs did not fall in this area.
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McCarthy!tes Identified the new guard and Dean Bowen as radicals. In 
some newspapers, Bowen was referred to as a "socialist," an advocate of 
the "welfare state," and a "Washington bureaucrat." Economics Chairman 
Everett Hagen believed that the old guard had directed a "whispering 
campaign" to invoke rumor and slander against Dean Bowen. Hagen asserted 
that certain faculty members had organized a plan to spread malicious 
lies that the department had brought In outsiders to Indoctrinate students. 
In answer to these charges, President Stoddard told the Board of Trustees 
that he had found no "suggestion of such Infiltration" In any "responsible 
public reference." He concluded, "The Department of Economics Is not 'red'; 
it Is not 'radical'." Stoddard Insisted that all faculty members "appeared 
to be defenders of capitalism." In spite of the President's response, public 
pressures and attacks continued and threatened the University's 
reputation. Here, It was apparent how one group used the anti-communist 
Issue to discredit the opponent.25
Stoddard and the Board of Trustees were pressured by Republican 
members of the legislature to dismiss Howard Bowen. Rep. Charles 
Clabaugh and Sen. Peters, who both represented the University's district, 
most vocally demanded Bowen's ouster. Clabaugh warned, "I feel the 
legislature will not provide the money necessary to run the University as 
It should be run unless Dean Bowen is replaced at once."25 McCarthyite 
legislators frequently threatened to cut the University's budget unless 
they behaved In "proper" ways.
President Stoddard received a great deal of criticism for the way he 
handled the conflict from both outside and Inside the University. The 
public attacks from newspapers and from state legislators revealed the
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tension between conservative Republicans and the more liberal President 
Stoddard. Rep. Clabaugh admitted that his overall confidence in the 
President's ability "to administer the affairs of the University" had been 
greatly reduced by the economics shake-up. Beliefs such as this added to 
Stoddard's troubles and contributed to his eventual ouster 27
Since Stoddard was In Europe at the outbreak of the conflict, he was 
criticized for neglecting campus affairs. In October 1950, one individual 
told the President that the controversy "could have been handled much 
better by your office, six months ago, than It was handled." Legislators 
and trustees were angered when Stoddard was quoted In the News-Gazette 
as saying that the clash in the College of Commerce was insignificant i;i 
comparison with world problems.2® This type of bad press created even 
greater tension between the President and those for whom he worked.
Within the University, Stoddard was subject to the criticism from 
his own faculty. This pressure, for the most part, was not on a large scale. 
The Executive Committee of the College of Commerce, which was 
composed mostly of old guard anti-Bowen members, criticized Stoddard's 
passive role In the conflict. The Committee asserted, "We have spent many 
hours in seeking resolvement of the issues" while the President had 
contributed little. Howard Bowen also had a few words for Stoddard. Years 
later, he expressed his disappointment In the administration's role In 
helping him to avoid conflict. Early in 1949, Bowen realized that he was 
"heading for trouble" and turned to Stoddard and Provost Griffith for 
advice. At this point, Bowen revealed, "They really failed me.29
By far, Stoddard’s strongest critic on the faculty was old guard 
Economics Professor Don Kemmerer. Denouncing the President's support of
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Bowen as "prejudiced," Kemmerer declared that It was “high time the 
public realized" Stoddard's unfairness. He openly criticized not only 
Stoddard's role In the Commerce controversy but also the man himself. 
Kemmerer asserted, "He Is Master of the art of omitting vital evidence, 
distorting It, making mistakes and not acknowledging them, and implying 
things without saying them."30 Kemmerer greatly antagonized the new 
guard faculty who had faith in the President and his policies.
Tension between the factions Intensified as the controversy 
remained unsolved. Two pro-Bowen professors sent identical letters to 
department head Hagen requesting "leave without salary." Each professor 
felt that they could not "continue In a situation where my presence 1r. 
resented, my working arrangements are considered Inequitable, my salary 
Is begrudged, and where I am accused of proflttlng from favoritism."31 
President Stoddard needed to calm the hostile environment within the 
economics department as well as to respond to the outside pressures.
On November 24, 1950, an Advisory Commlttte made up of College 
of Commerce alumni and state business leadei s recommended the 
dismissal of Howard Bowen as Dean to the Board of Trustees. Bowen 
offered his resignation, accepting the decision "In good grace." Almost all 
of the newer faculty left the University of Illinois within the next year, 
Nonetheless, today, Bowen Is remembered as a scholar whose "Intellectual 
poise and insight" contributed leadership and many Improvements to the 
University.32
The shake-up In the College of Commerce clearly revealed some of 
the forces that President Stoddard confronted. A conflict that involved 
personality differences and administrative mistakes developed Into a
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full-scale political issue. The President faced great opposition from 
members of the media. A heavy tension was evident between Republican 
leslglators and the more liberal-minded Stoddard, who had by 1950 
clashed over many Issues. Critics came from within the faculty as well. 
Howard Bowen himself was not satisfied with the policies of President 
Stoddard. Clearly, Stoddard's role in resisting pressures directed toward 
himself and the University was a difficult one. The impact of this 
resistance, as evidence will show, was limited.
By 1960, Joe McCarthy was notably absent from the national 
political scene. The Red Scare had cooled and a new decade had arrived. At 
the University of Illinois, a slight resurgence in the radicalism issue 
appeared. Now, however, the administration behaved differently as the 
McCarthyite pressures that President Stoddard had faced were not as 
fierce.
Engineering graduate student Edward Yelltn was Indicted on four 
counts of contempt of Congress. Summoned by HUAC while a student at 
Colorado State University, Yellin had refused to testify on the basis of the 
First Amendment. In June 1959, the Supreme Court declared that such a 
refusal qualified as contempt of Congress. Charges against Yellin were 
filed. If he had refused to testify by taking the Fifth Amendment, no 
contempt citation would have been tsssued. In I960, Yellin was found 
guilty, and the University suspended him.
Because Yelltn was appealing the verdict, many felt that the 
suspension decision was premature as he had not yet had " his full day In 
court."3-5 The administration responded favorably to the mounting protests 
of the United States National Student Association and of the University of
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Illinois Senate. Yellln was reinstated following a recommendation of the 
Subcommittee on Graduate Student Discipline.
Students and organizations voiced their approval. The American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) declared that the University 
of Illinois' decision had "made a genuine contribution not only to the 
academic community but to our democratic society as a whole." A writer 
for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch noted the difference In the University's 
reaction to Issues of radical nature. The writer proclaimed," Under the 
rules of the McCarthy period Mr. Yellln might have been dismissed outright. 
Instead, the University deserves great credit for avoiding Inflexible 
judgment of a scholar who claimed freedom of conscience." In 1963, the 
Supreme Court overturned vell1n's conviction for contempt of Congress. He 
completed his Ph.D. work In Mechanical Engineering at the University of 
Illinois and entered the field of biophysics.^4
In the Cold War era, many Issues were hotly-debated as the radical 
came under attack. The exclusion of the Communist from areas of 
American life was both challenged and defended. McCarthyltes vigorously 
attempted to advance their fight against communism by passing 
restrictive legislation. In Illinois, the McCarthyltes did not need any real 
evidence of subversion to attack and Investigate academic Institutions.
The tense atmosphere of partisan conflict characterized the mood in the 
state and evolved as a test of political strength. McCarthyltes pressured 
the President Stoddard most vocally, presentlno a formidable obstacle for 
the administrator. Legislators also attacked the broader Ideology of 
liberalism, charging that New Dealers, keynesians, and Progressives were 
dangerous to national security. In a later chapter, It will be shown how
management leaders used the McCarthyite issue against the 'radical" 
pro-labor Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations (ILIR). After 
examining the administration of President George Stoddard and the 
controversy In ILIR In the chapters that follow, one can determine whether 
resisting the McCarthyites really did any good.
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Chapter 2
Public Pressures and Strategic Resistance
By the late 1940's the atmosphere of McCarthylsm was alive and 
well as pollticans formed around the anti-communist Issue. Asserting 
that communists not only could but should be excluded from certain areas 
of Amerlcn life, McCarthyltes worked to purge the academy of radicals. 
G*ven this situation, the university administrator was in a difficult 
position. Cooperating with the McCarthyltes might have reduced the 
pressures on the university, but only at the expense of many Innocent 
victims. Administrators could resist the attacks and strongly vow to 
protect civil liberties at all costs, particularly the right of free speech. 
President Stoddard assumed a middle position. Even though he resisted the 
McCarthyltes, he denied the legitimacy of the absolute version of 
academic freedom. As It was, resistance proved to be an exercise in 
futility. As a proponent of reformist Ideology, George Stoddard was 
viewed as a personal and political enemy of McCarthyltes in Illinois. Even 
though the President declared himself an anti-communist, legislators 
were doubtful because of Stoddard's opposition to the McCarthyite 
movement. Many factors made Stoddard particularly vulnerable to 
legislative attacks. Thus, as this chapter will show, Republican 
McCarthyite conservatives used a range of methods to "get Stoddard" and 
finally to defeat him altogether.1
George Stoddard's viewpoint on the fitness of the Communist 
teacher was like that of the Sidney Hook, Norman Thomas, and Arthur 0. 
Lovejoy. While arguing that a Communist should not be allowed to teach,
30
Stoddard stressed the Importance that academic freedom be preserved 
within the university. The Civil Libertarian group opposed this school of 
thought, declaring that beliefs alone were not reason enough to exclude an 
educator from his profession. Influenced by the fact that a large number of 
innocent scholars fell victim to McCarthylsm, some recent historians have 
condemned the academy for Its cowardice, particularly criticizing the 
Stoddard Ideology. Ellen Schrecker referred to this position as a 
redefinition of academic freedom "to require the exclusion of the 
Communist teacher." Lionel Lewis also denounced this viewpoint, 
asserting that this school of thought helped to establish a "negative 
climate of opinion" against the scholar. Lewis charged that the university 
administrator was "more Interested In public relations" than preserving 
and protecting civil liberties.2
George Stoddard was recruited from outside the area for the 
position of President at the University of Illinois. He was not familiar 
with the political atmosphere In the state, nor was he well acquainted 
with members of the legislature of of the Board of Trustees. A change in 
administration was a natural shake-up for the University. Also, in the 
post-World War 11 era, the campus was growing by leaps and bounds and 
administrative decisions had to be made very quickly at times. Individuals 
who did not approve of Stoddard as an administrator used the 
anti-communist Issue to discredit him.
Many Republican conservatives In the General Assembly and on the 
board of Trustees disliked Stoddard's appointments. Because a large 
number of the newer faculty members had worked In Washington or had a 
liberal background, some became suspicious. Parlcularly when controversy
31
erupted In the College of Commerce, many new scholars were termed "New 
Dealers," "socialists," or "bureaucrats." Not only were critics unhappy with 
Stoddard but also with those who were connected to him. This became 
evident In the 1950 Board of Trustees elections when a Stoddard 
supporter was purposely replaced.
Few university administrators opposed the McCarthyite movement 
or fought against unwarranted attempts to purge radicals from the 
academy. George Stoddard was one of the select group who did. While 
recent historians might criticize his position of the status of the 
Communist teacher, they would have lauded his resistance to the 
McCarthyltes. Stoddard’s case Indicated the complexity of the Issue of 
academic freedom with respect to the f itness of the Communist educator. 
Some recent historians havo charged that the university administrator 
reidjusted the meaning of academic freedom In order to exclude radicals 
for professional reasons rather than political ones. This chapter will 
question this stand by showing how successful Stoddard was In resisting 
the McCarthyltes.
By 1949, a partisan struggle in Illinois characterized the political 
scene. A great deal of tension existed between Democratic Governor Adlal 
Stevenson and the conservative GOP legislators. A good working 
relationship was never established between the two branches. President 
Stoddard supported Governor Stevenson, and the two had a friendly 
personal relationship. This alliance caused Immediate suspicion among 
McCarthyite legislators. Stoddard's reformist Ideology alone was a 
vulnerability. Combined with his support of Stevenson, who did not get 
along well with the Republicans, turned this match up into a power
32
struggle. In the General Assembly, the anti-communist issue was, for the 
most part, a method that Republicans used to discredit their political 
enemies. The term "conservative" will be used to refer to this group.
As a liberal anti-communist, George Stoddard stood firm on the 
Issue of academic freedom, at least as he defended it. McCarthyltes were 
suspicious of what they considered an unorthodox viewpoint. Stoddard 
emphasized the Importance of Intellectual freedom within the university, 
Including the "right to think, to speak, to be heard, and to dissent." He 
declared, "Nobody Is to tell us what to think, when to think, or whether to 
think...In education we think --  or education stops."3
President Stoddard did recognize that even something as vital as 
academic freedom had its limits, For Stoddard, this freedom was not a 
"black-or-whlte concept" but an Issue where various balancing factors 
needed to be considered. He questioned, "How much diversity can we 
permit? Certainly not enough to condone the criminal, the psychopath, the 
subversive." He firmly believed that the Communist educator had no place 
In the academy because "he is not free to evaluate the past or the future 
with scholarly detachment." After encountering Communist delegates to 
International conferences, Stoddard noted that their "standards of 
personal and professional conduct" were “shocking." Toleration therefore, 
did not extend to the radical. Stoddard concluded, “ We are free In all 
respects save one; we are not free to tolerate the destruction of our 
freedom." Civil Libertarians would have considered the statement 
ridiculous given the limitations that the anti-communist movement had 
placed upon freedom of speech.4
Ignoring the reality of the President's anti-communist stand,
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Republican legislators were angered over Stoddard's strong opposition to 
the McCarthytsm. He publicly denounced the McCarthyltes who threatened 
intellectual growth by frightening teachers into submission to the 
orthodox. Stoddard warned that the McCarthyltes" mindless search for 
radicals could lead to a new irresponsible and repressive" search for the 
nonconformist. Governor Stevenson commenced President Stoddard's 
ideology, declaring, "Thank God for people like yourself who are both able 
and willing to pound these points home on every occasion.” Statements 
such as these certainly did not endear Stoddard to the McCarthyltes.5
As the legislative pressures increased, Stoddard's criticism of the 
McCarthyltes became more fierce. Legislators attacked this oppostlon 
along with his reformist agenda for the University as a "soft" stand 
against communism. In the continuing power struggle between the 
President and members of the General Assembly, each side looked for 
ways to exploit the other's vulnerabilities. Stoddard delivered a most 
biting speech directed against the McCarthyltes entitled, "Paranoids 
Versus the People." He Identified the McCarthyite as a "paranoid," and 
Individual who was "anxious," "Insecure," and deceitful. Stoddard Insisted 
that the "paranoid" enjoyed the fear and submission in others and 
especially "liked to play king." According to Stoddard, the McCarthyite 
behaved as "if he had been commissioned by God as First Informer, f rst 
Inqutsltltor, and First Executioner." He charged that the "paranoids " 
efforts to locate traitors and saboteurs had resulted In few successes; 
"not enough thus far to start a stampede at a Sunday school p icn ic '6
Stoddard's opposition to the McCarthyite movement was backed by 
the belief that subversives were most effectively rooted out by the FBI
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and other security agencies. Governor Stevenson shared this view, 
stressing that "the really dangerous subversives and saboteurs will be 
caught by careful, constant, professional Investigation" rather than by the 
McCarthyite purges. Stoddard, like Stevenson, opposed an Issue that some 
legislators held dear7
The fierceness of President Stoddard's opposition to the 
McCarthyltes may have made him appear more liberal than he actually was. 
It is Important to remember here that Stoddard assumed the middle 
position or the "vital center."® His role In the Cazden case clearly showed 
his anti-communism. The professor's quiet dismissal perhaps also 
demonstrates a lesson about the pressures of the legislators. As long as a 
university administrator got rid of the trouble-makers, that institution 
could avoid bad press and major controversy.
Norman Cazden came to the University of Illinois in 1950, and by 
1953 was on the verge of receiving tenure. In the spring of that year, 
Cazden was Informed that his contract would not be renewed for the fall 
term. When he approached President Stoddard to discuss the reason for his 
dismissal, Cazden was shown a document that Identified him as a member 
of the Cambridge, Massachusetts Communist Party, as well as being 
connected with thirteen ether radical organizations. In no position to 
defend himself because most of the allegations were true, Cazden 
departed from the University In June. The report Itself was most likely 
prepared by the FBI, a unit that Stoddard believed should handle the fight 
against communism.9 It would have been Interesting to see how the 
President would have reacted if the same charges had been filed by the 
state McCarthyltes. Details of this Incident are unavailable because the
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Cazden file remains confidential at the University of Illinois.
A year later, a former University of Michigan coilegue Identified 
Cazden as a member of the Communist Party. Cazden was summoned to 
Washington by HUAC. When questioned about his political affiliations, he 
took the Fifth Amendment. Cazden was blacklisted like many other 
educators and did not return to academic life until 1969 at the University 
of Maine.
McCarthyltes preyed on President Stoddard's Involvement In the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), a unit designed to help bring education to other countries. In 
1946, Stoddard had been chosen as one of the five United States delegates 
to the conferences In Europe. McCarthyltes criticized UNESCO as a “fifth 
column" whose purpose was to aid the Soviet regime as well as to teach 
"world-mlndedness to the youth of America." To McCarthyltes, Stoddard's 
reformist connections with this organization were a sure sign of hls 
"softness" on communism. Others felt that the President's Involvement In 
UNESCO too often kept him away from campus affairs. Some trustees and 
legislators concluded that Stoddard's first concern was for a globalist 
body ruther than for the University of Illinois.10
As a strong-minded administrator who refused to cooperate with 
state legislators, George Stoddard's own personality made him more 
vulnerable because many people simply did not like him. The President was 
a poor lobbyist for the University and did not have good relations with 
members of the General Assembly. Most significantly, Stoddard told one 
newspaper that he was "not displeased" by the fact that he did not get 
along well with legislators. Although many considered Stoddard to be an
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"outstanding educator," they recognized that he was also "Impulsive, 
quick-tempered," and had a "way of alienating folks." One unidentified 
trustee described Stoddard as a man "who could not keep out of 
controversial Issues" and who "seemed as if he liked nothing better than 
to get Into a big fist fight." Many simply felt that the President "lacked 
the ability to get along with people" and failed to "pay enough attention to 
the people for whom he worked." * ’
The best assessment of why Stoddard's personality added to tension 
between himself and legislators was by a long time reporter of the 
Champaign-Urbana Courier. Through the hobby of "President-watching," 
the writer noted that Stoddard "was impatient with slower minds --  and 
almost all minds were slowe'*." The Journalist also observed that 
Stoddard's "ferocious drive to get all this chit-chat over with and get on 
with the Job was a fascinating thing to see —  or a frightening one —  
depending on whether or not you were In the line of fire." Most of the 
President's opponents had been In this line of fire at one point or 
another.’2
One Issue on which McCarthyite legislators might have anticipated 
Stoddard's opposition was the 1949 faculty loyalty requirement by 1949 
Illinois Statute. The oath was applicable to public employees without 
specifically mentioning educators. Stoddard commented, "To the 
astonishment of the right-wing members of the Board of Trustees, I 
tended to laugh It off." The President pointed out that he had "taken half 
dozen similar oaths over the years In relation to my military service."’3
Although Stoddard did not directly oppose the loyalty oath 
requirement, he withheld his full support and failed to appease the
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McCarthy I tes. Traveling along the center line In this way, Stoddard was 
hit by cars going in both directions. Some legislators resented the 
President's criticism that it was the "fearful and uninformed" who 
Insisted upon stirring up this atmosphere of suspicion.14 Civil 
Libertarians disliked the fact that Stoddard's position did not go far 
enough In fighting the loyalty oath requirement.
George Stoddard was vulnerable to legislative hostility for a 
number of reasons. McCarthyltes sought ways to discredit the President, 
attacking him In ways that would eventually lead to his ouster. Stoddard 
had to overcome great pressures form the outside to have any success in 
resisting the McCarthyltes. In the rest of this chapter, two significant 
points will be shown. First, the events and attacks demonstrate what 
areas and methods the McCarthyltes used to expose Stoddard's 
weaknesses. Secondly, the Impact of the President's response was 
Indicative of the magnitude of these pressures.
Stoddard Under Fire
With the help of the anti-communist issue, opponents engineered 
the first step of George Stoddard's ouster In the 1950 Board of Trustees 
elections. Controversy erupted In the summer of 1950 over the selection 
of candidates to the Board. Th'1 Alumni Association traditionally 
suggested three Individuals to each party before the conventions. Named to 
the Republican ticket were Wayne Johnston, Howard Megran, and Chester 
Davis. Local GOP conservatives considered Johnston and Megran 
acceptable, but balked at Davis. Chester Davis was seen as a Stoddard 
supporter who had been a member of the committee that hired tne
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President. As a result, a group of Champaign County Republicans organized 
an effort to substitute former mini football great Harold "Red" Grange for 
the Incumbent Chester Davis at the August GOP convention. The opposition 
to the administration of George Stoddard was alive and well.
Reactions throughout the campus area were mixed. The local 
Republicans defended the effort, pointing out that Grange’s name was 
well-known throughout the state and would strengthen the party ticket as 
a whole. However, others within the Party saw no reason for the switch 
that would defy the tradition of accepting the Alumni Association's 
suggestion. This split would materialize later at the GOP convention.
Some Republicans took advantage of the upcoming elections to 
restate their strong position against communist subversion, particularly 
In connection with the University of Illinois. Although not attending the 
August 1950 convention himself, Grange declared his commitment to the 
ouster of “red sympathizers, socialists and wild-eyed radicals" from the 
University faculty. In Springfield, Chester Davis' critics spotlighted his 
ties to President George Stoddard. Rep. Ora Dlllavou, In a McCarthy-like 
flurry, charged that there were "at least 50 Reds, pinks, and socialists" on 
the University faculty. Dlllavou further charged that, “Davis hired the man 
(Stoddard) that's been hiring them “ Clearly, the move to exclude Davis 
from the Board of Trustees was a first step In engineering the ouster of 
Stoddard.15
As noted earlier, Republicans divided over the Issue of the Grange 
substitution. In a close vote, 869-798, Grange was chosen to replace Davis 
on the GOP ticket in November. The split In the party demonstrated that 
much of the anti-Stoddard sentiment came largely from local
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conservative McCarthyite types rather than the Republicans per se. The 
Champalgn-Urbana Courier called Grange's victory a "clear triumph for a 
relatively small group of Champaign County GOP leaders." It was pointed 
out that Grange was not even a graduate of the University, as he had quit 
to pursue a career in professional football. The News-Gazette, however, 
accepted Grange as the "people's choice."16
In November, the Republicans swept statewide elections, including 
the race for the Board of Trustees. As a state-supported Institution, the 
University of Illinois was subject to many outside pressures because the 
purse strings were held by state legislators and taxpayers. The University 
was also one of the few schools whose Board of Trustees was elected and 
not appointed. Because of this, the trustees were subject to the will of 
the general electorate. The Grange substitution clearly showed how 
accessible the Board was to those outside of the University. Board 
candidates needed to campaign, as Grange did with his McCarthyite 
rhetoric. As a public official, a trustee had to respond to the electorate's 
demands and suggestions if they wished to remain In office. These factors 
added to the University's pressures from the outside.
A few days after the GOP convention, President Stoddard officially 
responded to Dlllavou's charges against the University. Stoddard's liberal 
anti-communist position worked to his advantage. By accepting Dlllavou's 
anti-communist goals, he was able to point out the legislator's 
Irresponsible lack of evidence. A Civil Libertarian would not have been 
able to respond In this way to meet the charges of radicalism. Stoddard 
sent Dlllavou eleven sheets of paper on which he asked the legislator to 
name the ”50 Reds, pinks, and socialists" along with his evidence. The
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President's message was purposely conciliatory to best alleviate 
Dlllavou's charges against the University. The President wrote, "Since your 
knowledge apparently goes beyond mine, 1 am making an appeal to you, as a 
loyal citizen to give aid." Stoddard pointed out that because of the 
faculty-required loyalty oath, "to be called 'Red' Is serious" and "it also 
Implies perjury." Of the 9317 University employees, he reported, only two 
or three were currently under surveillance. After this message, Dlllavou 
could not claim that Stoddard was a protector of Communists. 1 ^
In Illinois, anti-communism was largely a partisan Issue. GOP 
McCarthyltes attempted to discredit their Democratic opponents by 
attacks of radicalism. President Stoddard was swept Into this conflict. 
President of the Board of Trustees Kenney Williamson approved of 
Stoddard's request for the names. Williamson declared that the Board was 
"becoming tired of being unjustly accused," and If there was "someone who 
knows something that we don't know, we should be given the information." 
He admitted that there were probably "some Reds" at the University, but 
he knew of no cases specifically.1®
Rep. Dlllavou failed to produce any names or evidence and advised 
Stoddard to find his own list. Dlllavou suggested the members of the 
f aculty would know "who some of the subversives are." In the attempt to 
save face, Dlllavou erratically attacked the University for Indoctrinating 
"youth with radical political philosophies." President Stoddard 
consistently followed his middle path conciliatory strategy. He replied 
that the University was "extraordinarily free" of persons who responded to 
the "fake lures of Communism." Nonetheless, Stoddard Insisted that his 
administration did not "Intend to relax our vigilance."19
4In reaction to the Dlllavou charges, President Stoddard ordered a 
campus Investigation. By October, the prou was completed, and Security 
Officer Joseph Ewers had discovered "no known Communists" on the 
faculty. Ewers Insisted that he had never known "any member of the 
faculty at Illinois to commit a subversive act." Stoddard reported the 
results of the Investigation to the Board of Trustees. He declared, “We 
have not been able to find any Communists on the campus; all we have 
found Is a few misguided persons. There Is no evidence of subversiveness, 
of perjury or of the disclosure of secret materials." The President 
concluded that Dlllavou's charge that the University possessed a 
“substantial group of disloyal persons" was groundless. Stoddard's 
political stand as a liberal anti-communist offered him an advantage in 
responding to McCarthyite attacks. He could pursue a middle path by 
recognizing the goals of anti-communism but by demanding responsible 
evidence. However, public pressures mounted and the Impact of Stoddard's 
resistance methods was reduced.20
Other than the offlcal responses to President Stoddard, Rep. 
Dlllavou remained silent. The entire Incident, one Chicago Sun-Times 
reporter speculated, appeared "to be another 'Get Stoddard’ movement 
rather than a real effort to find red-hued teachers." McCarthyltes 
continually sought ways to exploit the President's vulnerabilities to gain 
a political advantage.21
In spite of Stoddard's attempts to resist and refute charges of 
radicalism, McCarthyltes charged on. The University was referred to as a 
"hotbed of communism." McCarthyltes attacked the faculty's opposition to 
the 1953 Broyles bills as a “smear campaign." One c ’tlzen argued the need
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for a "cleansing committee" to purge the University, claiming that the 
ltbrary contained novels written by Communists, movies “made In Russia," 
and records that contained "a decided proletarian flavor." As public 
officials, legislators and trustees were concerned about criticism of this 
sort. President Stoddard worried about the Unlve: J ty 's  reputatton as well 
and tried to resist the charges.22
McCarthyite legislators continued the attacks on Stoddard 
personally and upon the University. Rep. Horsley most vocally criticized 
the President for hts failure to get rid of the radicals. He declared, "I don't 
like the administration of Dr. George D. Stoddard and I don't mind saying 
so." Horsley pledged, "Before the next session, I Intend to do something 
about It." He suggested that Stoddard's days as President of the University 
of Illinois were numbered. Horsley also tried to discredit the faculty when 
he charged that his son had been graded down In "retaliation" to his own 
support of the 1953 Broyles bills. The charge was groundless, as Horsley's 
son already had academic difficulties prior to the debates on the Broyles 
legislation.23
Stoddard again tried to meet the charges of radicalism by 
emphasizing, "No members of the faculty are disloyal, subversive, or 
Communistic." Security officer Ewers pointed out In Stoddard's defense,"In 
my six years, I have never known him to protect a Communist." However, 
the President could not quiet the charges of radicalism given the 
magnitude of outside public pressures. In this case, what people thought 
was true was more Important than what actually was true. Stoddard's 
resistance had no tremendous impact on McCarthytsm tn Illinois.24
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Resistance Defeated: The Climax of "Black Friday"
The fate of the Stoddard administration was determined on July 24, 
1953, a day that the President would remember as "Black Friday." Harold 
"Red" Grange called a private session of the Board of Trustees with no 
item on the agenda. In this conference format, the Board was not required 
to record their proceedings, After midnight, President Stoddard was called 
into the session, warned by one trustee, "Prepare yourself for a shock!" 
Stoddard was then informed of the Board's 6-3 vote of "no confidence" in 
his administration. A few minutes later, Provost Coleman Griffith was 
ousted as well. Griffith's dismissal, Stoddard mused, was probably due to 
"guilt by association." Stoddard's opponents had played their trump card.25 
The actions and proceedings of the Board of Trustees became the 
subject of controversy. University regents would normally consider the 
ouster of an administrator carefully and not without consulting the press, 
the public, or some academic or civic body. Even four members of the 
Board had not been Informed as to what the nature of the midnight session 
would be. Coleman Griffith commented, "We learned the next day that quite 
a number of the Janitors on the Urbana-Champalgn campus had known" 
about the proceedings before they were made public.26
Because the Board of Trustees did not offer one clear reason for the 
Stoddard "no confidence" vote, many speculated over the cause. Most 
seemed to agree, however, that a political deal was behind the ouster. One 
professor named Park Livingston, President of the Board of Trustees, as 
the "chief architect" In the midnight firings, criticizing him as a man "who 
regards his Presidency of the Board of Trustees as the step in the 
direction of higher office." One newspaper suggested that Stoddard's
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ouster might aid Livingston's bid for the GOP Senate nomination.27
In the attempt to explain why Stoddard was ousted, the Chicago 
Tribune cited fourteen controversies that marked his administration. The 
article mentioned the conflicts In the College of Commerce, the charges of 
radicalism on the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations (discussed In 
the following chapter), and the attacks made by Rep. Dlllavou at the 1950 
GOP convention. Stoddard believed that Livingston had been the source of 
the article, but the Board of Trustees President denied this. Stoddard 
responded to each charge and the article was printed a week later. Even 
after his ouster he was not Immune to pressures and attacks against his 
character.28
Stoddard's tendency to become Involved In controversial Issues was 
one of the factors that led to his defeat. Many Individuals believed that 
the "Kreblozen affair," an issue unrelated to radicalism, had directly led 
to the President's dismissal. Kreblozen, discovered by Dr. Stevan Durovlc, 
was a drug for the treatment of cancer. Dr. Andrew Ivy, head of the 
Department of Clinical Science at the University of llllnols-Chlcago, 
believed in the drug and publicly announced a new treatment for malignant 
tumors. President Stoddard was skeptical and decided that the University 
In Urbana-Champalgn should conduct Its own Investigation. The Cole 
Committee concluded that kreblozen had "no curative value In the 
treatment of cancer," and recommended that the treatment of patients 
with the drug be halted until it was discovered Just what It was. Durovlc 
had refused to reveal its ingredients and continued to collect millions of 
dollars from desperate cancer patients for injections. Hopeful supporters 
of kreblozen lobbied against restrictions on the drug, charging that
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Stoddard had limited freedom of Inquiry. It was not until 1963 that 
researchers discovered that kreblozen was nothing but mineral oil. Dr. Ivy 
and Dr. Durovlc were Indicted for criminal conspiracy and mall fraud, but 
both were found not guilty.'^
By 1953, Stoddard's political ally Adlal Stevenson was no longer In 
the governor's chair. The change to the Republican administration of 
William Stratton made Stoddard's dismissal easier to arrange. Politically, 
Republicans had no use for the President as Stevenson had. In this sense, 
Stoddard's ouster was the consequence of a partisan struggle In Illinois. 
One newspaper reported that Governor Stratton "had been one of the 
masterminds behind the ouster." Stratton was vacationing In Colorado at 
the time of the midnight f i r i n g s . ^
For many, the Stoddard firing was no great surprise. The Chicago 
Sun-Times reported, "It had been known In Springfield for some time that 
some legislators don't like Stoddard" because of his political stands and 
his "general aloofness." In Springfield, Livingston told reporters, "There 
was not on the Board a person who did not know Stoddard's days were 
numbered. The whole question was one of procedure, of how to get rid of 
him." He declared, "The common greeting to a University trustee over here 
(Springfield) was 'When are you going to get rid of Stoddard?'" Clabaugh's 
reaction to the ouster seemed to confirm this assessment. Commenting 
that he was "agreeably surprised" over the Board s actions, the legislator 
revealed that he had "felt for the last year that it was inevitable."31
George Stoddard himself believed that his ouster was a 
well-planned political manuever as characterized by the "midnight ride of 
Paul Revere Livingston." The President declared that the McCarthyite
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"technique" was to "attack public universities and funding If the 
administrators say or do the 'wrong' things." Stoddard's frustration was 
evident as his resistance to McCarthylsm was one factor that led to his 
ouster. Provost Coleman Griffith also believed that the firings had been 
prearranged, confirming to two close friends, "Yes, your thought Is 
correct, a wicked political deal lies In the background." Griffith concluded, 
"The wolves have finally caught up with Dr. Stoddard and me.''32
At the height of criticism, Livingston held his ground. He responded 
by rudely stating, "The plain truth is that George Stoddard had made 
himself a pain in the neck to so many people on so many issues for so long 
a time by his arrogance and duplicity that six of the nine trustees...became 
fed up and expressed their lack of confidence in him." Livingston, as well 
as other Board members who had voted against Stoddard, defended their 
position against the harshest critics.33
The Illinois Government received its fair share of backlash from 
Stoddard supporters who particularly criticized the anti-communist 
movement. Connecting the ouster directly to the "deteriorating political 
scene," one man wrote, "I do not believe I'm exaggerating when I say that I 
see this as an act of McCarthylsm on a state level.” Many believed that 
state leaders had taken the antl-communlst movement too far. in a letter 
to a state Senator, another man declared, "Our people are growing very, 
very weary of Legislative, state and national, encroaching on the other 
departments of government, especially the Executive." One newspaper 
wrote that Stoddard had been the "victim" of "the anti-liberal spirit" and 
of "antl-lntellectuallsm."34
Not only Stoddard supporters protested the method of the ouster.
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Trustee Wayne Johnston, a conservative Repbubltcan, was not known to be 
a fan of the Stoddard administration. Johnston believed that the 
proceedings had been unfair, and that Stoddard's dismissal was 
unwarranted. Voting In favor of the Stoddard administration, Johnston 
asked the President to change the wording of his resignation from "in view 
of the vote of the Board of Trustees" to "In view of the vote of the 
majority of the Board." Johnston also agreed that the meeting had been a 
"well-planned campaign by Park Llvlnsgston" and "Red Grange, his stooge." 
Johnston's opposition to the ouster suggested that a Republicans split 
over the McCarthyite Issue, a division that had surfaced eariler at the 
1950 GOP convention.36
In search of one particular scapegoat, many Stoddard supporters 
directly criticized Harold "Red" Grange, the trustee who had called the 
midnight session. One newspaper denounced Grange as a "synthetic 
alumnus who departed from the University before finishing to reap a 
fortune from the football reputation that the school he abandoned had 
permitted him to gain." Others, like Wayne Johnston, identified Grange as a 
"stooge" of Park Livingston. Stoddard had to agree. He told one reporter, 
"'Stooge' Is your word. My word Is that he is a creature of Park Livingston." 
Grange, like Livingston, held his ground, claiming that he would resign 
from the Board of Trustees before he changed hls vote.36
On campus, Stoddard had a great deal of support. A week after the 
proceedings, a group made up of faculty, students, and local citizens 
marched to the President's house. The News-Gazette reported that 
numbers reached 500, but the Champalgn-Urbana Courier estimated as 
many as 1500. The marchers sang "For He's A Jolly Good Fellow" and
carried signs and banners, one of the boldest being "We Have 'No 
Confidence’ In the Board of Trustees."37
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Twenty-two department heads from the College of Liberal Arts and 
Sciences circulated a petition of protest of Stoddard's ouster. They 
declared that the actions of the Board had been "contrary to all accepted 
standards of academic procedure." The faculty members saw the firings as 
"morally unjust," although "technically legal." The University Senate 
confirmed that a "strong feeling" existed "among the faculty that the 
drastic procedure followed was unfair and had resulted in serious danger 
to the University's reputation." In 1954, these twenty-two department 
heads were commended by the Academic Freedom Committee of the 
American Civil Liberties Union for their position In defense of free 
education. Livingston, however, was not impressed. He warned the 
protestors, “These pets had better stick to their education or go 
elsewhere.”38
Eleven former trustees, later Joined by nine more, issued their own 
petition of protest to the current Board of Trustees. Stressing that the 
University belonged to "the people of this state" and not the "faculty or its 
alumni or of any group of polmeans," the former trustees denounced the 
use of the University for "political ends." The midnight session, they 
insisted, lacked the "common decency" that a "fair hearing" would require. 
The method of the ouster was Just as controversial as the reasons for the 
dismissal itse lf39
in October 1954, Stoddard was listed along with the twenty-two 
department heads by the ACLU for "effectively demonstrating their belief 
in the principles of freedom and equality in education." The Committee
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commended Stoddard, who had "persisted even to the point, of discharge 
from hts post, In resisting political Interference In matters of educational 
policy and administrative discretion." Stoddard's defeat had been 
engineered by political conservatives, partly In reaction to the reformist 
spirit.40
In time, protests subsided and Stoddard supporters were forced to 
abide by the Board's decision. Comptroller Lloyd Morey replaced Stoddard 
as President of the University of Illinois. In 1955, David D. Henry took over 
and began his long reign. George Stoddard left Champalgn-Urbana and 
accepted a position as Dean of the School of Education at New York 
University. He later moved on as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at 
Long Island University. In 1968, Stoddard returned to the University of 
Illinois campus to lecture and was honored with a Doctor of Laws degree.
George Stoddard was susceptible to a great deal of outside pressure 
because of the many vulnerabilities of his character. Largely because of 
his reformist ideology, he was attacked by conservative Republicans who 
applied the anti-communist issue to partisan politics. Stoddard's middle 
position as a liberal anti-communist offered him some advantages in 
responding to McCarthyite attacks. However, this school of thought also 
gave Stoddard some trouble as he was criticized by both the right-wing 
McCarthyltes and the left-wing Civil Libertarians. The President's 
resistance to McCarthylsm was unsuccessful. The pressures mounted and 
finally erupted, resulting In the political ouster of Stoddard. Given this, 
the indictment of academic cowardice by recent historians is 
questionable. The case study of the administration of Dr. George D. 
Stoddard has demonstrated that resistance to McCarthylsm aid not have
much of an impact on the political scene In Illinois.
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McCarthylsm and the "Labor College"
Chapter 3
The late 1940's was one of the most volatile times In the history of 
labor-management relations. The transition of the labor force from war to 
peace time was anything but smooth. Thousands of labor-management 
disputes broke out. To help improve relations, colleges and universities 
developed programs to address these crucial Issues. The University of 
Illinois was strongly urged by the Illinois State Federation of Labor (ISFL) 
to set up a program to offer "expert and detailed knowledge and advice in 
order that equality and Justice be done for the workers In meeting their 
problems." ’ The College of Commerce had been encouraged to take on labor 
aspects of Industry, but for reasons that are unclear, failed to do so. Plans 
for a labor college soon had to be adjusted. Management groups were 
suspicious of the evolving Institute from the start. Combined with the 
anti-communist movement and the growing unpopularity of labor unions, 
the new Institute was headed for trouble. Business leaders attacked the 
Institute as pro-labor, and therefore, radical. Management groups, with 
the help of McCarthyite legislators, pressured the Institute to include 
business and Industrial programs, and the original conception of a labor 
college was altered. In this sense, the McCarthyltes were effective In 
spite of the University's resistance.
Even though the University tried from the very beginnings of the 
Institute to avoid controversy, the faculty found themselves under fire. In 
resistance to the public pressures and the charges of radicalism, the 
University behaved In ways not unlike those institutions that yielded to
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the McCarthyite forces. Administrators warned faculty members to avoid 
controversy and reminded them of their special role in the community as 
an educator. Labor unions played a leading role In the Institute's founding, 
but only a supporting role during Its period of "crisis." By this time, the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was facing its own “crisis" as 
McCarthyltes began to focus on the radical factor within the labor unions. 
When the charges of radicalism against the Institute did fade, It was 
largely because of a split in the conservative ranks rather than the Impact 
of the University’s resistance. This chapter examines the administration's 
response to the public attacks on the Institute of Labor and Industrial 
Relations (lUR) with respect to the McCarthyite forces. First, the 
preconditions must be examined.
The Setting Before the Storm
Labor unions were the logical place where Communists who wanted 
to cause political unrest might go. The strongest foothold of the Party In 
the United States was within labor organizations. Given the emerging 
anti-communist atmosphere, a labor-oriented college would be 
hard-pressed to avoid trouble.
Three years after the formation of the CIO, the Communists had 
either "complete or partial control" of 40% of its unions at the local level. 
By 1939, pro-communists "had taken over" Industrial Union Councils In 
many states, including in Illinois. During World War II, the Communists 
cooperated tn the wartime economy to a large degree, supporting 
government policy and denouncing strikes. Clearly, the Communist Party 
had at least some influence on labor unions by the end of the war.2
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For labor, the transition from war to peace was an arduous one. 
Workers faced lower real wages, rising prices on consumer goods, and 
growing unemployment. By 1945 and especially 1946, a wave of strikes 
swept the nation, and hostility between labor and management grew. Labor 
unions became increasingly unpopular wtth the public at large. Consumer 
discontent mounted due to Inflated prices and frequent shortages. The 
anti-communist forces connected these problems to Communist 
infiltration. Some of the strongest voices in management refused to 
cooperate with union leaders until the Communist Influence was gone.
This tension between labor and management was clearly evident in 
Illinois. As the McCarthyite movement gained momentum, because the 
Faaculty of the ILIR was perceived as sympathetic to labbor, they were 
considered suspect.
Labor organizations had high hopes of establishing the Institute 
that would reflect their own programs and policy. At the 60th annual 
convention of the I5FL in 1942, the Milk Drivers Union Local 753 of 
Chicago sponsored Resolution 96 to encourage the University of Illinois to 
develop a department "with properly qualified labor economists and 
analysts to advise and supply information which will assist the workers 
In their many complex problems." What the group had in mind was a 
service similar to what the University offered the farmer through the 
College of Agriculture. After investigating the matter, a subcommittee of 
the University recommended a budget of $50,000 to create a new 
Institute. Disappointed, the ISFL leaders sponsored a bill also to create an 
Institute, but at the budget of $400,000. Dean of the College of Law Albert 
Harno presented the University's objections to the ISFL bill before the
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House Education Committee, stressing management's apprehension of the 
formation of a "labor college “ As a result, the ISFL substituted another 
bill, adjusting the amount to $150,000. The bill merged into the 
University's general appropriations proposal and was approved in June 
1945. Labor leaders were optimistic, declaring that the founding of the 
Institute was "one of the finest advances for labor In many years." Through 
the University's programs, leaders believed that "many apostles for the 
great labor movement will have been won." Labor groups were confident 
that their primary role In ILIR would continue. One labor leader declared, 
"For this great State University of a powerful rich state such as ours to 
launch such a program Is a victory Indeed for the efforts of the ISFL."^ 
Tensions between labor and management ran high at the birth of the 
Institute. University officials were well aware of the problems that 
would result by establishing a labor college. As early as 1943, ISFL 
leaders were told that "under no circumstances could or would the 
University become a special advocate for any group in the State, whether 
that group by industry or labor." In 1946, management groups voiced their 
hostility toward the evolving Institute. After meeting with business 
leaders of Illinois, University officials were able to establish two 
statements of policy and program for the new college. Management's 
cooperation was offered reluctantly, however. One campus leader wrote, 
"The conference was very unsatisfactory. The group was almost 
exclusively open-shop, anti-labor. They objected to everything —  the 
statement of policy, the name, the advisory committee, a Director friendly 
to labor." Business organizations maintained this hostility towards the 
ILIR and its eventual director, Phillips Bradley to a point where the
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anti-communist Issue became Involved.4
University officials tried tc appease both labor and management. By 
taking the middle position, as was true In the case of President Stoddard, 
the Institute was hit by cars going In both directions. On the management 
side, the criticism was much more fierce. In May 1946, the Griffith 
Committee, who had been appointed to work out details of the program, 
changed the name of the Institute from the Institute of Labor Relations to 
the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations.6 This was not a major 
concession, however.
Because of their suspicious attitude, management leaders insisted 
that the director should not be pro-labor. Although It Is not clear what 
criteria the Griffith Committee used to choose the director, It appears as 
If they made some effort to search for a neutral individual. Their first 
choice, a labor economist and arbitrator, was unavailable. Four 
alternatives were found, one of whom declined to be considered for the 
position. Why the Committee chose Phillips Bradley is not entirely clear. 
Some members felt that because the Institute was not yet a working unit, 
Bradley, whose background was in labor education and political science, 
would do the best “selling Job” for the new Institute. Bradley, as a Quaker, 
was pacifist on many issues of foreign policy. This fact would be later 
exploited by McCarthyltes even though Bradley was "not radical in any 
sense."6
Even though University officials had some reservations over what 
the Institute's scope would be, they believed that the problems would be 
overcome. Provost Coleman Griffith expressed concern that Bradley's 
“heart" was “a little pro-labor." He warned the new Director that "unless
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the Institute did hew to a strictly neutral line, It was going to have 
trouble." Griffith did not feel that this would become a problem given 
Bradley's determination to make the Institute a success. The University 
did not anticipate the fierceness of the McCarthyite pressures from the 
McCarthyite legislators and management groups.7
From the beginning, the University recognized problems that a 
pro-labor Institute would have. Officials attempted to adjust the program 
to ensure neutrality and to match the Interests of business organizations. 
In spite of their apprehensive pledge to cooperate, management groups 
housed a great deal of anti-labor sentiment. Opponents of labor continued 
to grasp at ways to discredit the Institute and its faculty, and soon they 
took advantage of the anti-communist issue to help their cause.
Labor Under Attack
The combination of management hostility and the rise of 
anti-communist movement meant trouble for the Institute. In the early 
months of 1949, controversy surfaced when management leaders publicly 
and privately charged that IUR was a pro-labor organization and a clear 
source of radicalism. Business leaders pressured University trustees and 
state legislators to more closely examine the Institute's programs and 
personnel, particularly those of the Extension program. In the words of one 
management leader, if Phillips Bradley "isn't Communistic, then he is very 
close to it." Many opponents of ILIR expressed concern that taxpayers were 
supporting a subversive organization. Seeking a way to strike at the labor 
coHtfe, management leaders lobbied legislators strongly to reduce or 
eliminate funding for the Institute. Presloent of the Board of Trustees
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Park Livingston was informed that “several of our Representatives and 
Senators have been asked to check very carefully the University budget 
recommendations" for IUR. As a state-supported institution, the 
University of Illinois found It difficult to escape attacks of this nature.8
In May 1949, conservative McCarthyttes found another point of 
attack. Labor Education Professor Herman Erickson, in a speech to a 
Socialist Study Group, declared that there was greater "Incentive to 
production under socialism that under capitalism."9 To many management 
leaders and state legislators, this served as proof that ILIR was an 
instrument of subversion. The speech In Itself was not a major event, but 
McCarthyltes seized upon it to promote their cause.
In resistance to the mounting charges of radicalism, the University 
behaved in ways not unlike institutions that capitulated to the 
McCarthyltes behaved. Wayne Johnston, who was then a member of the ILIR 
Executive Commute, demanded an explanation of Erickson's speech from 
Director Bradley. Johnston wanted to shield the University as a whole 
from any negative consequences that the controversy could bring. He made 
a special trip to Champalgn-Urbana to strongly advise the IUR faculty to 
avoid such controversy In the future.10 Civil Libertarians would have 
criticized this action as a violation of free speech.
Phillips Bradley tried to dissociate Erickson's views from the 
Institute and from the University as a whole. The Director stressed that 
the speech was nothing but Erickson's “own personal Judgement expressed 
at an unofficial meeting." Bradley Insisted that whatever his beliefs, 
Erickson was "not only an effective but an objective" instructor. The 
Director felt strongly about the preservation of academic freedom. Labor
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groups who had attended Extension courses taught by Erickson offered 
their support. One Individual speculated, “Either Mr. Erickson was badly 
misquoted or he kept these Ideas under cover in the classes which I 
attended."11
President George Stoddard's middle position on the academic 
f .dom with respect to the fitness of the Communist teacher showed In 
his response to Erickson's controversial speech. The President reminded 
the faculty of their “special position in the community." Stoddard 
emphasized the importance that a an educator "remember that the public 
may judge his profession and his Institution by his utterances...and should 
make every effort to Indicate that he Is not an Institutional
spokesman."’2
Civil Libertarians would have praised Stoddard's position In 
resisting the McCarthyltes' demands for Erickson's dismissal. In a 
personal letter, Sen. Peters wrote, "I heard Williamson (President of the 
Board of Trustees) tell Stoddard that he had to get rid of Erickson and 
Stoddard said It would be done."’^ Whether the President actually said 
this Is unclear. However, Stoddard did not "get rid o f  Erickson or Phillips 
Bradley, who later came under fire. This "failure" to take action against 
"radicals" was only one element that contributed to the tension between 
Stoddard and legislative McCarthyltes. In the long run, this resistance 
contributed to the President's dismissal.
Although this Is difficult to measure today as the only information 
available is the memories of the faculty, the Institute's professors 
reacted rather mildly to Herman Erickson's speech Erickson had developed 
a reputation among his collegues as someone who often would leave an
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Impression that was not at all what he intended. Faculty members excused 
his controversial speech, claiming, “That's Just Herman." No apparent 
resentment or antagonism developed within the Institute. Even though 
outside pressures mounted, the faculty Itself did not divide Into 
factions.’4
McCarthyltes were not satisfied. They directed the focus of their 
attacks on the ILIR to Its Director, Phillips Bradley. Leaders In the 
Rockford Chamber of Commerce ran a check on Bradley's past "radical" 
affiliations and circulated the telegram to members of the General 
Assembly. Bradley was said to have had connections to the Society for 
Cultural Relations with Russia, the Ultra Pacifist World Peaceways, and 
the mysterious Socialist Slacker Movement. The Director quickly wrote to 
President Stoddard, explaining the charges that he could, but some were 
too vague to Identify. He even added two items that could have been 
misconstrued as radical. Bradley's response clearly showed that the Items 
had been either grossly exaggerated or created altogether. However, the 
seed of suspicion had been planted in the minds of members of the General 
Assembly.
The telegram on Bradley served as another piece of evidence that 
McCarthyltes in management groups used to discredit the Institute. 
Management leaders increasingly pressured legislators, trustees, and 
President Stoddard to take action against the programs and staff of ILIR. 
One business leader Informed a trustee, "I can't help but be shocked at 
finding we have on the University payroll that we taxpayers are 
supporting, socialists, New Dealers and Communists."’5 McCarthyite 
legislators were quite willing to look Into the matter.
61
Either purposefully of not, management attacks occurred near the 
time when the General Assembly would take action on the University's 
budget. Management groups lobbied vigorously for the abolition of ILIR. 
According to former faculty members, although the staff was concerned 
about the Institute's reputation, they did not feel as though Its existence 
was at stake. Professors felt that ILIR had achieved so many positive 
things In labor-management relations In the community that the charges 
would be offset. Eventual’y. the benefits that the Institute brought to the 
state of Illinois did help to diminish the anti-communist attacks.16
By May 1949, because of the vocal McCarthyite attacks, it seemed 
possible that the Institute's budget would either be reduced or denied 
entirely. Sen. Peters reported that a budget adjustment was a "good 
probability." At the Senate appproprlatlons hearing, President Stoddard 
was asked to evaluate the degree of radicalism at ILIR. He testified that 
although some faculty were sympathetic to labor, the Institute contained 
no Communists. The President went on to deny the charges made against 
Bradley in the telegram and to defend Herman Erickson's effectiveness as 
an educator. Unappeased, one GOP Senator introduced an amendment to cut 
the Institute's funding, but it was defeated, By late May, the Senate had 
passed the University's budget.17
In June 1949, House action on the budget was upheld pending further 
investigation Into the charges made against the Institute. Concerned over 
ILIR's reputation, Bradley met with a group of legislators in Springfield to 
respond to the attacks. When one legislator questioned Erickson's fitness 
as a Socialist educator, Bradley was quick to point out the differences 
between socialism and communism. The Committee, however, refused to
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acknowledge any distinctions between the two schools of thought. The 
legislators were satisfied with Bradley s explanation of academic 
freedom, as he stated that the classroom was not an appropriate place for 
the educator to argue his personal views. To some extent, this was a 
concession for Bradley because of his strong belief In the preservation of 
academic freedom. The Director also conceded that the Institute did have a 
pro-labor look, but insisted that It was not intentional. Bradley pledged to 
consult more frequently with management representatives. The 
legislators were appeased, and Rep. Dtllavou and Rep. Lewis (R - Marshall) 
agreed to drop their amendments to adjust ILIR's funding.
When the Institute was under heavy fire from management groups 
and the General Assembly, labor groups refrained from publicly supporting 
ILIR for reasons that are unclear. President Stoddard was "astonished" 
over this failure. However, labor’s support of the Institute's programs, 
especially In Extension, was undeniably strong. Stoddard acknowledged 
this, declaring that the University was "immensely reassured" by this 
support. The ISFL did not offer a public resolution of support of ILIR until 
October 1950. In their weekly newsletter, the ISFL, which had led the way 
in the founding of ILIR, made no reference at all to the attacks upon the 
Institute.10
In spite of the General Assembly’s approval of the budget, 
management opposition to the ILIR was still very much alive. Efforts by 
management groups to abolish the Institute were quite vigorous, 
particularly In the Peoria and Rockford areas. In July 1949, Bradley agreed 
to meet with a group of Rockford businessmen, headed by Frank M. White, 
to discuss some of the Institute's problems. He brought along Herman
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Erickson and Associate Professor Earl Wolfe, who directed the lUR 's 
Management Education Program. Bradley knew that If the charges of 
pro-labor and radicalism against the Institute were to be alleviated,
Wolfe would have to play a key role In explaining the management 
programs.
The official report of the July 22 meeting gave the impression that 
opposition to the ILIR was fierce among the Rockford business community. 
The Committee concluded that Bradley s explanations of his alleged 
radical affiliations in the circulated telegram were "weak and 
unsatisfactory." The report also stated that the Institute's failure to 
equally emphasize labor and management was Intentionally engineered to 
favor the side of labor. This statement implied that the ILIR was a 
subversive organization. It appeared as though the anti-labor forces would 
not be satisfied until the institute was disbanded.19
The official report was quite deceptive, however. At the conference, 
a significant spilt developed between management leaders, resulting in a 
backlash against the anti-communist ultra-conservatives. As Earl Wolfe 
explained and answered questions about the Institute's plans for a new 
Cooperative Management Program, other business leaders, particularly 
Frank M. White, were Impatient and eager to return to the Issue of ILIR's 
radicalism. White's overly enthusiastic determination to find Communists 
proved to be detrimental to his cause. Much like Joe McCarthy, White 
pushed the Issue until it burned itself out. Businessmen reacted against 
White's pressure as he tried to gain support to force ILIR from the 
University.20
This backlash against the McCarthyltes greatly Influenced the
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development of management programs within the IUR. At the conference 
lunch break In Rockford, a group of business leades came together and 
planned another meeting to discuss the organization of the Institute's 
extension classes in the Rockford area. A week later, leaders coordinated 
a series of programs that specifically sought to encourage Rockford 
participation, almost pressuring industry "to change Its slant." The 
programs specifically aimed to reduce the hostility between labor and 
management In Illinois. The charges of radicalism against the IUR 
dissipated largely as a result of this split in management.21
One area where outside public pressure failed to penetrate was 
within the IUR faculty Itself. Although this is difficult to measure today, 
former faculty members have reported that to the best of their knowledge, 
the staff Itself did not alter or adjust their methods or curricula In the 
classroom. Within the department, a few changes did occur as a direct 
result of the attacks of radicalism. Many efforts were made to show that 
labor and management faculty members were pulling together instead of 
dividing. More joint labor-management classes were developed both on and 
off campus. Management Director Earl Wolfe and Labor Education Professor 
Herman Erickson were purposely made offlcemates to emphasize 
cooperation rather than division. The department leaders hoped that the 
two would exchange philosophies and “rub off" on each other.22
The original hopes for a labor-oriented college had been adjusted to 
include the interests of management. Business conservatives used the 
McCarthyite Issue to attack their opponent, labor. By 1950, labor 
organizations were disappointed with the changing scope of the Institute. 
The Milk Wagon Drivers sponsored a resolution to encourage other unions
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to become Involved with IUR programs In the attempt to make labor’s role 
primary as they had first hoped. The resolution declared," Labor has not 
received the proper recognition when you see what Agriculture and 
Industry get from our State Universities while millions of Its members 
support It with their taxes.”2^
Phillips Bradley submitted his resignation as Director in July 1949 
for reasons apparently not directly related to the radicalism issue. He and 
President Stoddard disagreed over questions of Jurisdiction in 
management classes between the College of Commerce and IUR. Stoddard 
Insisted that the Institute develop its labor programs as opposed to its 
business areas. Bradley disagreed, declaring that the management 
programs were necessary. How the McCarthyite attacks influenced 
Bradley’s thinking Is unclear. Within the Institute itself, Bradley also 
faced the faculty’s personal hostility over hls divorce.24 He resigned as 
IUR Director and moved to the Department of Political Science. A few 
years later, he left Illinois for a position at Syracuse University. Herman 
Erickson, who had also been the subject of attack, remained with the 
Institute until his retirement.
Uncertain of labor and management leaders' reaction to the events 
at IUR and to Bradley's resignation in particular, Stoddard told new 
Director William E. Chalmers to travel and explain that the University 
still strongly supported the Institute. Chalmers, whose background was In 
economics, was more flexible on the Jurisdiction issue that Bradley had 
resigned over. He had been a strong candidate for Director in 1946. From 
July through November of 1949, Chalmers traveled throughout the state 
and helped to ease tensions and clear up misunderstandings.2^ The
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Institute's controversial stage subsided, giving way to a period of 
stability.
As a public university, Illinois was particularly vulnerable to 
pressures from legislators and interest groups. Labor's strong hopes and 
plans for a labor-oriented college had to be readjusted. Officials sought to 
avoid conflict at the Institute's birth, but the University was unable to 
escape the hostile McCarthyttes. By using the anti-communist issue, 
management leaders forced the ILIR to consider their Interests, in 
resistance to McCarthylsm, the University behaved In ways not unlike 
those Institutions that yielded to the anti-communists. The ILIR faculty 
was warned to keep away from controversial issues. President Stoddard 
maintained his middle position and reminded the professors of their 
special role In the community, in his "failure” to dismiss Bradley or 
Erickson, Stoddard further hurt his own relations with members of the 
General Assembly, a factor that contributed to his ouster. Phillips Bradley 
resigned as Director over an issue unrelated to the radicalism crisis. In 
spite of all of the positive achievements that the Institute had brought to 
the community In labor-management relations, McCarthyltes found 
something to attack. When charges of subversion finally did fade away, It 
was largely due to divisions within the conservative anti-communist 
forces rather than any successful University resistance. The University of 
Illinois did resist McCarthylsm, but management leaders were still able to 
penetrate to the programsof the Institute the Labor and Industrial 
Relations with the help of the anti-communist issue.
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion
As the antl-communtst hysteria swept the nation, e
universities could not escape. At the University of llllnoi cCarthylsm 
shaped academic experience. These two case studies show ne degree to 
which the movement was able to penetrate the Internal affairs of the 
academy. Within the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 
McCarthyltes played a key role in shifting the orientation from a labor 
college despite the resistance of the administration and faculty. Also, 
even though President Stoddard vigorously opposed McCarthyite tactics, 
his resistance was one factor that contributed to his defeat. These two 
Instances show that because the University of Illinois was a public 
Institution, legislators found it easy to latch on to the antt-communist 
Issue to attack political and Ideological enemies.
Illinois McCarthyltes did not need any substantial evidence of 
subversion to continue advancing the anti-communist hysteria. On four 
different occasions, legislators sought to Impose restrictive laws upon 
radicals through the Broyles bills. Republicans especially adopted 
McCarthyite policies Into their politics. The anti-communist Issue 
surfaced In campaigns. As shown earlier, Harold “Red" Grange became 
“antl-Red" Grange to aid his bid for a seat on the University of Illinois 
Board of Trustees.
As the two case studies at the University of Illinois show, 
McCarthyltes frequently attacked broader liberal Ideologies. Stoddard's 
reformist agenda lor the University made him vulnerable to right-wing
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Republican charges. In the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations case, 
a progressive pro-labor concentration was viewed as subversive. As 
shown earlier, left-wing organizations were under suspicion as well, and 
the campus chapter of the American Youth for Democracy was banned by 
the Clabaugh Act In 1947. Also, In the College of Commerce conflict, 
educators connected to the New Deal or Keynesian economics were termed 
"radicals," "pinkish Intellectuals," and "bureaucrats."
Evidence from this study supports the observations of Paul 
Lazarsfeld and Wagner Theilens, Jr. that public universities were 
particularly susceptible to outside Influence from politicians, regents, 
and Interest groups. Illinois legislators, In many Instances, warned the 
University to behave In "proper" ways or else face cuts In funding. This 
threat was used by McCarthyltes most extensively to Influence the scope 
of the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations.
The question of whether radical views disqualified one from a 
teaching position ignited debates over academic freedom. President 
Stoddard followed a middle path between the McCarthyltes and the 
absolutist Civil Libertarians. Two recent major studies of McCarthyism 
and the universities by Ellen Schrecker and Lionel Lewis have criticized 
this stand, asserting that it was Just another way that administrators 
cooperated with McCarthyism. Although he did not believe in the 
absolutist version of academic freedom, Stoddard resisted the 
McCarthyltes. His liberal anti-communist position actually provided him 
with a stronger hand in confronting the attacks. Thus, Schrecker and Lewis 
do not provide a category for the Stoddard type. These two historians do 
address the fact that some administrators and faculty members were
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ambivalent In their response. However, they do not discuss this 
systematically. Both strongly assert that absolutist methods of 
resistance were the best way to stand up to McCarthylsm.
It Is easy to argue that universities should have most vocally 
resisted the anti-communist hysteria, but In reality, this was a difficult 
task. The Schrecker-Lewls Indictment of academic cowardice is 
questionable. Evidence from the two case studies at the University of 
Illinois shows that In spite of vigorous resistance, the McCarthyltes 
triumphed. Given the University's vulnerability to outside public 
pressures, this Is not surprising. It Is difficult to imagine that the 
absolutist Civil Libertarian stand would have been any more effective 
given the reality of these public pressures. President George Stoddard was 
defeated by a combination of personal and political opposition. Also, the 
original conception of a labor-oriented college had to be readjusted to 
suit the demands of conservative management groups, in both cases, 
McCarthyltes used the anti-communist issue to suit their purposes. And in 
both cases, In spite of resistance at the University of Illinois, it worked.
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